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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SEARLE BROTHERS, a partnership, 
DIAMOND HILLS MOTEL, a partnersh~, itoiJ 
RANCE W. SEARLE, RHETT A. SEARLE 
and RANDY B. SEARLE, 
vs. 
EDLEAN SEARLE, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants 1 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
APPEAL FROM FINAL 
DISTRICT COURT OP THI 
AND FOR UINTAH couN'tf 
PLAINTIFFS' AMBNDBD u· ....... 
PREJUDICB, HONORABQJ 
RAY E. NASH 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Respondent 
33 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
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JN 'I'll!: Slll'RU!l, couin Oi' TllL SL\ll 01' LJ'l1\ll 
SLi\RLL l\IWTI!l'i\S, a nartncrship 
lllJ\f\lONJJ !!ILLS ~.j()'[LL', a partncr~hip, 
R:\NC[ \\I. SEARLE, Rl!ETT /\. SF/\RU: 
and RANDY B. SEARLE, 
vs. 
I:DLEAN SEARLE, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 15604 
BRIEF OF PL/\INTHFS AND /\PPILLANTS 
********************* 
APPIAL FROJll FINAL ORDERS OF Tl!r FOURTH 
DISTRICT COURT OF TllE STATE OF UT/\!! IN 
AND FOR UINTA!! COUNTY, DISMISSING 
PLAINTIFFS' MIENDED CQillPLAINT \VITI! 
PREJUDICE, HONORABLE D/\VTJ: SM!, JUDGE 
********************* 
RAY E. NASH 
Attorney for Defendant 
and Respondent 
33 East f\!ain Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
CULLLN Y. CIIRISTENSEN, for 
CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR I:; ~!OODY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
SS East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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TNDJ:X 
STAT HI ENT OJ' CASJ:. . 
DISPOSITION IN LO\ffR COURT 
RELIEF SOU Cl IT ON AP PF.1\L. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . 
ARGUMENT: 
POINT I: 
CONCLUSION . . 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RUL INC THAT 
THESE PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS WERE 
BOUND BY THE DECREE OF DIVORCE IN 
CASE NO. 5790 (SEARLE VS. SEAl(LE), 
UINTAH COUNTY DISTRICT COURT, T!IESE 
PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS NOT BEING 
PARTIES TO SAID CASE NO. 5790. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SEARLE BROTHERS, et al., 
vs. 
EDLEAN SEARLE, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 1560'f 
ADDITIONAL CITATION OF 
AUTHORITY 
Additional citation of authority submitted on behalf 
of plaintiffs and appellants to be inserted at page 11 of 
appellants' initial Brief irrnnediately prior to "Conclusion" and 
addressed to the point that plaintiffs' and appellants' claims 
herein are not barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel as 
alleged by the defendant. 
The plaintiffs herein, not having been made parties 
to the divorce action between defendant herein, EDLEAN SEARLE, 
and WOODEY B. SEARLE, cannot be bound by the judgment of the 
Court in that proceeding. As stated by this Supreme Court in 
the case of Ruffinengo vs. Miller, 579 P.2d 342, decided 
May 5, 1978: 
"Collateral estoppel is not a defense as against 
a litigant who was not a party to the action and 
judgment claimed to have created an estoppel". 
-11-
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Respectfully submitted, 
~ 
/ . 
. . ,/ tt'f·' l 
Cullen . Christensen, or 
CHRIST~lSEH, TAYLOR & MOODY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
SS East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
Two copies of the foregoing were mailed, postage 
prepaid, to Ray E. Nash, attorney for defendant and respondent, 
33 East Main Street, Vernal, Utah 84.078, this :2$~ day of 
./£-k_:tc;;,,.t-c-i,/ . 19 7 8. 
?' 
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IN TIIE SUl'RLMF COURT OF TllE STJ\1T OF UTJ\II 
--------
SL!\RLE BROTHERS, a partnership, 
DIAMOND HILLS ~IOTEL, a partnership, 
RANCE W. SEARLE, RHETT J\. SEARLE 
and RANDY R. SEARLE, 
vs. 
EDLEAN SEARLE, 
Plaintiffs and 
Appellants, 
Defendant and 
Respondent. 
Case No. 15604 
BRIEF ON APPEAL OF PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS 
*********** 
STATE/l!ENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This case involves an appeal from final orders of 
the lower Court, Honorable David Sam, Judge, dismissing 
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint with prejudice and holding that 
a prior judgment of the same Court, Honorable George E. Ballif, 
Judge, Case No. 5790 (Searle vs. Searle), is res judicata as 
to the claims of these plaintiffs and appellants as to an 
interest in real property, these plaintiffs and appellants not 
having been parties to said Case No. 5790. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The matter was submitted to the Court on stipulated 
facts and memoranda of authority. From an order dismissing 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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the plaintiffs' /\menclccl Complaint w.ith prejudice, plai11tilfc; 
appeal. 
RLU L F SOI JC;l!l O'i /\!' l'F'\ L 
Plaintiffs ancl c1ppellants seek reversal o[ the Lo1ver 
Court's orders dismissing plaintilfs' /\me11clecl Complaint \vith 
prejudice, wherein plaintiffs sought a determination of their 
ownersl1ip in real property and a partition of that interest. 
ST/\THIENT OF F/\CTS 
This matter was submitted to the Court below on 
stipulated facts for a determination as to whether or not the 
Judgment of the Court in a prior case, to which plaintiffs were 
not parties, is res judicata as to the claims of plaintiffs in 
the matter now before the Court. (Minute Entry elated l·lay 31, 
1977, R-67) These agreed facts as shown by the pleadings an<l 
memoranda of counsel demonstrate that plaintiff SE/\RLE BROTHERS 
is a partnership consisting of plaintiffs R/\NCE W. SEARLE, 
RHETT A. SEARLE and RANDY B. SEARLE. Searle Brothers Partner-
ship, is in turn a 50% owner of another partnership, Diamond 
Hills ~lotel. The other 50% interest of the D.iamoncl llills ~lotel 
Partnership is owned by WOODEY B. SEARLE. (TR 134, Case 5790; 
R-114). WOODEY B. SEARLE is the father of the individual 
plaintiffs, RANCE IV. SJ:/\RLL, RllETT A. SEARLE anLl RANDY B. S[ARLl. 
and the defendant EDLEJ\N SFARLE is the mother of such plaintiff' 
(R-35, 68). ll'OODEY R. SE1WLE and defendant FDLJ:1\N SEARLE, 
previously husband and ,,·ire, were divorced by llcL·rce or the 
- 2 -
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Uintah Counly District Court cl<ited ~lay 17, 1973. (R-105-113) 
On January 16, 1967, the real property in question 
hereinafter referred to as the "Slaugh !louse" ivas purchased 
and paid for by check 1101884, drawn on the account of the 
partnership, D[fu\IOND llILLS ~IOTEL, but the deed to the property 
1vas ina<lverten tly prepared sho\\·ing 1\TOODEY B. SEARLE as the 
grantee. (Def's. Ex. 1112, Case No. 5790; R-118; TR-243, 249, 
260, Case No. 5790; R-115, 116). 
The books and records of DIAMOND flILLS MOTEL partner-
ship have, since 1967, shown the "Slaugh House" to be an asset 
of that partnership and all rentals therefrom up to the time 
of the divorce decree between WOODEY B. SEARLE and EDLEAN SEARLE 
ivcre divided equally between WOODEY B. SEARLE and the plaintiff, 
SEARLE BROTHERS partnership. (Def's. Ex. #12, Case No. 5790; 
R-118). 
During or about the year 1972, EDLEAN SEARLE commenced 
an action for divorce against WOODEY B. SEARLE in the District 
Court of Uintah County, State of Utah, Case Ko. 5790, the 
Honorable George E. Ballif, sitting as Judge. EDLEAN SEARLE, 
in the divorce action, claimed that the "Slaugh House" was an 
asset of the marriage between her and WOODEY B. SEARLE, which 
position was disputed by WOODEY B. SEARLE, who claimed the 
"Slaugh !louse" to be the property of the DIA~IOND HILLS MOTEL 
partnership and thereby 50% thereof was actually owned by 
SF/\RLE BIWTfJERS partnership, the plaintiff in this action. 
(llcf's. T:x. #12, Case No. 5790; R-118). The Court, in the 
- 3-
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cl j v o r cc a c t ion , ch o :' c to :1 <lop t th c l' o s i t i on o C J: ll LI:./\ N S Li\ IZ LT. 
an<l ;11,arL\cd her thl, "Slaugh llritl:'r" as p:11·t uC Jirr dic;tril>uti\'l' 
share of the mcnriar:c assets .in the IJccrce ol llivorcc. 
(Paragraph 2 (d) llcc rec of ll i \ orcc, Case i\o. S 790; lZ-10/). 
Neither party to the d ivorcc action, nor the Court, 
move<l or or<lered that the SE/\IZLL BROfllEIZS partnership or the 
other plaintiffs herein be nwcle parties to the divorce action 
although the plainti[fs and appellants in this action i.ere 
within the jurisdiction of the Court and service of process 
could have been obtained for that purpose. Plaintiffs in this 
action, !HIETT A. SE/\l~LL an<l RANDY B. SLl\RLE, did testify jn 
the <livorce action concerning their interest in the DI/\(.JOND !Ill!: 
~IOTEL partnl.'rship, but neither ivas interrogated specifically 
about the "Slaugh Ilouse". (TR, Case No. 5790, 196-204, 261-2631 
Based on this record and indicated facts, the Court 
below ruled that the plaintiffs' intere:;t in the "Slaugh !louse" 
was foreclosed by the Decree of Divorce in Case No. 5700; that 
said Decree \\'as res ju,licata as to these plaintiff:;; crnd that 
in any event the claims of the plaintiffs to the "Slaugh !louse" 
were barred on the grounds of collateral estoppeJ. The Court 
below thereupon dismissed the /\men<lecl Complaint of the plaintifi' 
'"it h pre j u dice . ( R - 8 0 , 8 1 - 8 2 , 8 5 - 8 6) . 
It is from these orders that plaintiffs appeal. 
- 4 -
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ARCU~IE~T 
P01NT l 
TllE LOWER COURT ERRID JN RULING TJJ,\T TllESE PLAINT IHS 
J\Nll APPELLANTS WERE BOUND BY TllE DECJZEE OF DIVORCE IN CASE NO. 
5790 (SEARLE VS. SEARLE), UINTAll COUNTY llTSTRIC:T COURT, THESE 
PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS NOT BEING PARTIES TO SAID CASE NO. 
5790. 
The orders of the Court below, being summary in nature 
and based upon stipulated facts, these facts as alleged in 
plaintiffs' Amended Complaint and as hereinabove set forth, 
must be considered as established for the the purposes of this 
appeal. (Frederick May & Company vs. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 
P. 2d 266) Thus the questions on appeal are reduced to a 
determination of whether, as a matter of law, such facts compel 
a finding of res judicata and estoppel against these plaintiffs 
and appellants. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that they do not. 
This Supreme Court in the case of Tanner vs. Bacon, 
103 Utah 494, 136 P. 2d 957, held: 
"It is well settled that the doctrine of res judicata 
does not operate to affect strangers to a judgment. 
It only affects the parties and their successors in 
interest and those who are in privity with a party 
thereto. The word "privity" refers to a mutual or 
successive relationship to the same right or property. 
As applied to judgments or decrees of court, the 
word means one whose interest has been legally 
represented at the time." 
The foregoing principle of law has likewise been 
adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in the cases of Colemen vs. 
f\utkovich vs. Summit County, 556 P. 2d 503; Bank of Vernal vs. 
- 5-
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~in tah Co _un t y ~__ll_2 __ ll_!_a]:i '1}iG_7._'i()__l'_.~2_d_~8_l_;_Hc_C~ai:_!)'_ v_s_:_l'_~:i_.:k_'.-; 
~~~'~ _i'._ 1 !? v e _J__ri_s_~a_!_l_C: ~ -~o_mp_a~t- i_c~~, __ S_~:1 __ I' : __ 2_c~_J_l 7:_2_; __ BL' Tl__ll_i_o n 
J ns u ran cc c:_o~~y vs _. _ _____l__:c<-0_ '£C:~_rp_O:!:_i_1:!_L ~1 ri_,__s _ZL -~--2-~ _ __!__0__:_)__<! ; a ncl 
F cder al Land_j0__ri_](_Q_l____ll_c r ~e J CL_V s .__l_'a c _('~ _ _§_7 _l_f_!_ah_l_:S_()_, __ ~_8 __ ~_ 2d 
480. The principle is also djscussc:d in 46 /\m. Jur. 2d, 
paragraphs 518-532. 
Some examples of privity are: Executor ivith testator; 
heir with ancestor; assignee with assignor (but not assignor 
with assignee); donee with donor; and lessee with lessor. 
Privity means "derivative interest". 
Midwest Oil Companyt C.C.A. Wyoming, 17 Federal 2d 71). The 
term "privity" denotes a mutual and successive relationship to 
the same rights or property. (Taylor vs. Barker, 70 Utah 534, 
Plaintiffs take the position that at the time of 
the hearing of the divorce case before Judge Ballif, there was 
no privity between these plaintiffs in this case and WOODEY B. 
SEARLE. Their interests in the property in question ~ere not 
mutual and were not the same. Plaintiffs do not claim any part 
of the interest of WOODEY R. SEARLE, but assert their own 
independent and separate partnershjp interest to SO'a of the 
property involved, the "Slaugh House". 
It appears clear that partnership interests are not 
privy to each other. Such interests are separate and distinct, 
rather than successive and mutual, and, consequently, plaintiffs' 
interests in the property in this case are not privy to the 
interests of WOODLY ll. SE1\RLE. 
209, 209 P. 2d 387). 
-6-
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To further clcmonstrate the point, partners are 
characterized as co-owners o( specific partnership property 
under ~~~o_n 4 8_::_l_::__?lJ_lL___Q_t:_c'.!_i_f_c:_c~(2~_no t ~_c:§__l~~ts amend eel. 
Such an interest is the exact opposite of successive or privy 
interests. In fact one partner may even have a lien on the 
partnership interest of another partner. (illartin vs. Carlisle, 
46 Oklahoma 268, 148 P. 833, 6 A.L.R. 154). 
The property in question, the "Slaugh House", having 
been purchased with partnership money, it was a partnership asset 
irrespective of the fact that title was taken in the name of one 
of the partners, WOODEY B. SEARLE, (Fullmer vs. Blood, 546 P. 
Zd~), an<l \VOODF.Y B. SEARLE, as a partner, had no right to 
enlarge his interest in partnership assets by any statement 
which may have been attributed to him in the divorce action, 
nor did the Court in that divorce action have any power or 
authority to litigate and rule upon the interests of these 
plaintiffs in the property in question without these plaintiffs 
having been made a party to the divorce action. 
The defendant argued in her memorandum to the trial 
court that since WOODEY B. SEARLE was a partner of these 
plaintiffs, he was also their agent for the purposes of receiving 
notice and taking action with respect to matters involving the 
specific partnership interests of these plaintiffs. While a 
partner is the agent of the partnership for purposes of partner-
ship business while acting within the scope of his authority, 
_(:c;_.ection 48-1-6 to 48-1-10, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended), 
- 7 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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such agency docs not ext c n, l h c yon cl pa r t n c r :; h i p :1 I L1 j 1 s . I h c 
fact that ;.i portnl't, L'Cl()llLY B. SJ.\l~LL, 11·;1:, sued for cli\·oru~ 
clicl not l<1ake him on :igcnt of the other partners h'.i.th rc'S!'l'Ct 
to partnership property, nor in any h:1y make the partnership 
or the other partners privy to the Llivorce action or 1n any h':1y 
hound by the divorce decree. (!JJ_ll_J.rcl vs_:__l~~~~1~g_l~_ ,;__l:lpra.) 
\\! i th res pee t to the contention argueLl hy clef enclan t in 
her memorandum to the Court belo1v, \vhich position 1vas adopted 
by that Court, to the effect that plaintiffs herein shoulcl llOh 
be cstoppecl from making a claim against the property in questio11 
b cc au s e they cl i cl not ass c rt that c 1:1 i m i n the d iv or c e a c t i o 11 , 
it is true that nlai11tiffs did ha\·e kn01'1eclge or the divorce 
proceeding, but the Lnv appears to he cl car to the c IFect that 
actual knowledge of a proceeding 1vhich might affect one's inter-
est in property does not necessarily cause one to be bound by 
a j u<lgmen t in that proceeding (BaT1_l~_ol_V e rn ~'...:L~s. lJ int a~_~_l:l.ll~}_', 
~~1pra), nor does the fact that one m:i.y have the right to inter-
vene in such an action, hind one 1mcler a juclgment in that actior1 
if in fact one does not intervene (46 /\m~--·_3~1!.__p'1!:.'..1)>,r~r_!_i_S;in 1 
The Bank of Vernal vs. Uintah County c:i.se cited abore 
appears particularly in point, since in that case it 1vc1s held 
that a \dtness 1vho testified in the prior acti.on, but 1;as not 
effectively made a party thereto, 1;as not bound by a juLlgmc11t 
th er c in. (See a 1 so ~o 1 C!ll_'.l_n __ ~~:-~'! ko\' i ch vs. Sum1!.1._i_t: _C:Sl_l_JJ_t_tX, 
supra, and ~lei-a rt y ~,;_.___l':i_El~ s_~_:'_. __ Ho y .'._t.l__Q_ l c_i3:i£__1_l!_s L_l~ncc Cr1rn1~"n i 1 -
supra.) 
-s -
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The concept ol estoppel i111plies that someone has at 
one time ta1'en a position or !ailed to take a position so as to 
cause ;111 innocent party to act in reli;i.nce thereupon and to 
there;iftcr seek to take a different position to the detriment 
of the innocent party. As stated by this Supre111e Court in the 
case of ~lo rgan vs. Bo:ird of St;i.tc Lands 5·19 P. 2d 695, to-wit: 
"Estoppel is a doctrine of equity purposed to 
rescue from loss a party who has, without fault, 
heen deluded into a course of action by the 
wrong or neglect of another. Estoppel arises 
when a party by his acts, representations, or 
admissions, or by his silence when he ought to 
speak, intentionally or through culpable 
negligence, induces another to believe certain 
facts to exist and that such other acting with 
reasonable prudence and diligence, relies and acts 
thereon so that he will suffer an injustice if the 
former is permitted to deny the existence of such 
facts." 
Plaintiffs' actions or inaction with respect to the 
divorce case between WOODEY B. SEARLE and EDLEAN SEARLE did 
not mislead anyone so as to require imposition of the doctrine 
0 r estoppel. There is competent evidence in the record which 
shows that the Court in the divorce case was apprised of informa-
tion 1Vhich showed that the "Slaugh House" was really a partnership 
;i.sset in 1Vhich these plaintiffs \Vere interested. (Def's. Ex. 
1112, Case No. 5790; R-118; TR-243, 259, 260, Case No. 5790; 
R-115, 116). The fact that the Court in the divorce action 
apparently chose not to helieve such evidence, does not show 
any inconsistent position on the part of these plaintiffs or 
indicate in any1vay that these plaintiffs ll'ere trying to mislead 
either the> Court of the defendant herein, EDLU\.\I SEARLE. 
-9-
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I\ t t c ll t i () n 0 f t h c: cull t t i ;; d i r l' c t l' d t (l t h e c a ; ; c CJ r 
The facts of t!Ett case shOh' n sil1t;1tion ,,:herein the doctrine 
of cstoppel shoul<l proper!)" ;1pp I\'. /\recitation or the facts nr 
that case will <lemunstratc the diffc:rence fnrn1 the ca:oc JIO\v undt 
consideration: 
"In suit No. 2888 Civil, defenclJ.nt as oivner of 
the 11' right IV at c rs sought ;t n a <l j u di cat ion as a g a inst 
all claimants on the River of the amount o[ said 
Wright Waters as 1vell as its priority. llefenclant 
employe<l Tanner ;1s cin adviser and consultant all dur-
ing the litigation. One of Tanner's duties 1"as to 
advise and aid defendant i.n joining in said suit all 
parties 1-:hich hacl, or might have, cl;iirns to 1vater 
which might he affected by a decree in said suit. 
Defend;int \\'as seeking to set at rest every claim 1d1ich 
in any111ay might inpinge on its rights as finally 
settled in the decree. Knowing this, plajnti[[ fallcJ 
to notify dcfend~rnt of his claim unLler /\ppljcation 
!\:rnu-A hhich hcctmc CertiFicate 13l0. Therefore, 
1d1 i l e p l :i in t i f r ' s r i g h t s u n, l e r i\ pp 1 i cat i o n 4 :rn 6 - I\ 
(Certificate 1310) ivere not considered jn No. 2888 
Civil, it Kas plaintiff himself 1\'110 1vas at fault in 
not asserting them. As adv is er to defcnclant he h'O.S 
hound to direct attention to all claims challenging 
either priority or amount of defendant's claims ivhich 
might directly or jndirectly injure or affect its 
rights. This he failed to do and thus estopped 
himself to assert his claims later." 
The record in this c;ise clearly shows that these 
plaintiffs did not do anything to mislead FDLU\N SE/\RL[ or the 
Court in Case No. 5790 so as to support a claim for estoppel. 
The position of the plajntiffs in Case No. 5790 111as indicated, 
but was ignored. The doctrine of equitable estoppel cloes not 
operate Jn favor of one ''iho has kno1vleclge of the essential Cad' 
or who has convenient and av:lilahle me;i.ns of obtaining such 
knowledge. 
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ilcfendant, herself, or the Court for that 
111atter could have made plaintiffs herein parties to the divorce 
action in vie1-: of dc[end::mt's J:xhibit 1112 in that case (R-118); 
ho11·evcr, since that 1,·as not done, these plaintiffs are not bound 
by that d cc re e in Ca s c No . S 7 9 0 ( R LI l e 19 [ b ] , Utah I~ LI le s o f Ci vi 1 
CONCLUSION 
If allowed to stand, plaintiffs' ownership interest 
in the property in question, the "Slaugh House", will have been 
terminated by a Decree of Divorce to which plaintiffs were not 
parties and under circumstances that do not justify such a 
result on a theory of estoppel. 
The orders of the Court below dismissing plaintiffs' 
Amended Complaint with prejudice should be reversed. 
-11-
Respectfully submitted, 
;;;::/ ~ /!:{: ~· 
i(J;;;L{ &!,7_~.t. .._/' ,c~,f:C-?-.: ::!-C..,...) 
C"ullen Y.' ristensen, for 
CHRISTEN· ,1 , TAYLOR & MOODY 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
and Appellants 
SS East Center Street 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C!Rl r [· r c: \Tl OJ' ~J..\ l Lr NC 
'J'h'O C 0 [l i C'S 0 f th CC f Or C '.: U i ll g Br j C: f \n: r l' 1!1 a i l C cl, 
p 0 s tag e pr c I' a j_ <l ' t 0 r~ a y I. . 1\! as Ii ' a l t 0 r n (' r r 0 r d (' r c 11 ,1 all t and 
rcsponclent, 33 Fast r!ai.n Street, Vernal, Utah 81078, thi.s 
tJp-CZ clay of ~larch, l'l78. 
- 1 2 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
